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Abstract
A vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to use exclusive contracts
to foreclose an equally eﬃcient upstream competitor and to eﬀect a cartelization of the
downstream industry. Its ability to do so may be limited when downstream firms are
heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions.
The extent of cartelization depends on the degree of downstream market concentration
and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust scholars have devoted much ink to the competitive eﬀects of vertical mergers
(Riordan and Salop, 1995). For the most part, the economics literature focuses on how
vertical integration per se alters pricing incentives in relevant upstream and downstream
markets. The Chicago school of antitrust, represented by Bork (1978), emphasizes that the
eﬃciencies of vertical integration are likely to cause lower prices to final consumers, while a
more recent strategic approach to the subject, represented by Ordover, Salop and Saloner
(1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990), shows how vertical integration lacking any redeeming
eﬃciencies might have the opposite purpose and eﬀect. Choi and Yi (2000) and Church
and Gandal (2000) consider richer models that feature trade-oﬀs between anticompetitive
eﬀects and eﬃciencies. The debate is far from settled, in no small part because workable
indicia of harmful vertical mergers are lacking except in special cases (Riordan, 1998).
The use of exclusive contracts by customers and suppliers in intermediate product mar-
kets is equally controversial. The courts and antitrust agencies historically have treated
exclusive dealing harshly, finding in many cases such practices illegally to foreclose competi-
tion. The Chicago school disputes this approach, advising instead that exclusive contracts
are presumptively eﬃcient, because usually it is unprofitable to foreclose competition via
exclusive contracts without good eﬃciency reasons (Bork, 1978). More recently, industrial
organization economists have studied alternative models that demonstrate equilibrium in-
centives to foreclose more eﬃcient potential entrants with exclusive contracts (Aghion and
Bolton, 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1988; Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley, 1991; Segal
and Whinston, 2000).
An important institutional feature of some intermediate product markets is the coexis-
tence of vertical integration and exclusive contracts. For instance, in Standard Oil Co. v.
U.S. (1949), Standard Oil sold about the same amount of gasoline through its own service
stations as through independent retailers with which it had exclusive dealing contracts. In
Brown Shoe Co. 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), Brown Shoe had vertically integrated into the re-
tailing sector while using exclusive dealing contracts with independent retailers. In U.S.
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v. Microsoft (D.D.C. 2000), Microsoft’s had license agreements with competing online ser-
vice providers, requiring them to promote and distribute Microsoft’s Internet Explorer to
the exclusion of competitive browsers. This institutional feature is potentially important
because, as we shall show, the incentive for and eﬀects of exclusive contracts may depend
on whether an upstream supplier is vertically integrated, and, conversely, the returns to
vertical integration may depend on the possibility of exclusive contracting.
While the existing economics literatures on vertical integration and exclusive contracts
yield important insights on the competitive eﬀects of these practices used in isolation, the
literatures generally ignore incentives for and eﬀects of these practices in combination. The
purpose of this paper is to uncover an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts
and vertical integration, and to develop a model for analyzing how these practices comple-
ment each other to achieve an anticompetitive eﬀect. More specifically, we argue that a
vertically integrated upstream firm has the ability and incentive to use exclusive contracts
to exclude equally eﬃcient upstream competitors and control downstream prices.1 The ex
post eﬀect is a cartelization of the downstream industry. Neither exclusive dealing nor
vertical integration alone has this anticomptitive eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 previews our basic ideas. We illustrate
the relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing in a simple model of
industrial organization with two identical upstream and two identical downstream firms.
We then discuss potential complications that may arise if the downstream firms are het-
erogeneous and there are non-contractible uncertainties, providing a transition to our main
model with these features. Section 3 studies the main model of the paper. We demonstrate
that a vertically integrated firm can profitably employ an exclusive contract to raise input
prices and to cartelize the downstream industry, but the cartelization is in general only
partial when downstream monopoly prices vary with non-contractible market conditions.
1As discussed later, the Hart and Tirole (1991) model explains the exclusion of only a less eﬃcient
competitor. While the Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (1990) model does demonstrate the equilibrium exclusion
of an equally eﬃcient competitor, some controversial assumptions of the model limit its applicability (Hart
and Tirole, 1991; Reiﬀen, 1992; Ordover, Salop and Saloner, 1992).
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Adapting the logic of the recent literature on private bilateral contracting (Cremer and
Riordan, 1987; Hart and Tirole, 1991; O’Brien and Shaﬀer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz,
1994; Rey and Tirole, 2003), we further show that exclusive contracts do not achieve this
anticompetitive eﬀect if the industries are vertically separated. Section 4 concludes by
discussing these results in the contexts of the existing economics literature and of antitrust
cases. Appendices A and B relax the restrictive assumption that the downstream market
is a duopoly by considering two alternative models of downstream markets with multiple
independent competitors: the “spokes” model and the circle model. The results obtained
earlier extend naturally to these two models, with the additional insight that the extent of
upstream foreclosure and downstream cartelization depends importantly both on the nature
of competition (non-localized versus localized) and on the degree of concentration in the
downstream market. Proofs for some of the results in Section 3 are in Appendix C.
2. BASIC IDEAS
That vertical integration and exclusive dealing can combine to foreclose an equally eﬃcient
upstream competitor and to raise downstream prices is easy to demonstrate in a simple
model of industrial organization. Suppose there are two identical upstream firms, U1 and
U2, and two identical downstream firms, D1 and D2. The downstream firms require one
unit of an intermediate good to produce one unit of the final good, for which identical
consumers have a known reservation price V . Downstream costs per unit of production are
equal to C < V and upstream costs are normalized to zero. If the firms are independent,
then Bertrand competition in the upstream market followed by Bertrand competition in
the downstream market results in a final goods price equal to C. Against this backdrop,
a vertically integrated U1-D1 has an incentive to purchase an exclusive right to serve the
downstream market and charge final consumers a price equal to V . For example, U1-D1
might pay D2 to withdraw from the market, or, alternatively, acquire D2. Such blatant
monopolization likely would meet objections from antitrust authorities. More benign in
appearance is an exclusive requirements contract that achieves the same anticompetitive
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eﬀect. A contract that requires D2 to purchase from U1 at a price of V −C fully extracts
monopoly rents from the downstream market. Firm U2 is excluded from the upstream
market, and final consumers pay V to purchase from either D1 or D2.
It is interesting that D2 does not need much persuasion to agree to purchase its require-
ments exclusively from U1-D1 on non-competitive terms. If D2 were to decline an exclusive
requirements contract with U1-D1, and instead to deal with U2 on competitive terms, then
vigorous competition from D1 would squeeze out downstream profits to the point where
D2 would be happy to have fallen into U1 ’s exclusive arms for a small concession, e.g. a
small fixed fee. The Chicago school correctly observes that a downstream firm must be
compensated to agree to forgo the benefits of upstream competition (Bork, 1978), but the
above simple model shows that the necessary compensation need not be large if the firm
has little to lose because of vigorous downstream competition.2 An exclusive contract ef-
fectively monopolizes the downstream industry, and the monopoly rents can be shared in
some measure by all concerned firms.
It also is interesting that neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieve
these anticompetitive eﬀects if contracts are bilateral. The vertically integrated U1-D1
could not persuade the independent D2 to pay a supra-competitive price for the interme-
diate good without an exclusive contract, because D2 would retain an ex post incentive
to purchase from U2 on competitive terms and cut its retail price to steal business from
D1. Similarly, unable to commit to a multilateral contract that binds both D1 and D2,
a vertically-separated U1 is unable to pay D1 and D2 enough to induce them both inde-
pendently to forego the competitive alternative (whether the contract is private or public).
Thus, vertically-separated upstream firms in equilibrium maximize bilateral profits by of-
fering each downstream firm an eﬃcient two-part tariﬀ that sets the unit price of the
intermediate good equal to marginal cost.3
2 In formalizing and qualifying Bork’s argument, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) ignore downstream
competition and vertical integration in their models of exclusive dealing.
3Hart and Tirole (1990) show that, when contracts are private, an unintegrated upstream monopolist
similarly fails to achieve the monopoly outcome, and that partial forward integration (with a single down-
stream firm) solves the upstream monopolist’s commitment problem and ”restores” monopoly power (Rey
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Matters are more complicated if downstream market conditions are uncertain and non-
contractible. Suppose that C is a random variable, and that the realization of C becomes
known after contracting for the intermediate good, but before setting downstream prices.
Suppose further that requirements contracts take the form of uncontingent two-part tar-
iﬀs. Then monopolization of the downstream industry by U1-D1 is accomplished with
an exclusive requirements contract that excludes D2 by setting the marginal price of the
intermediate good above all possible values of V − C. Otherwise, competition from D2
would drive the downstream price below the monopoly level in some states of the world.
Thus, under conditions of uncertainty and non-contractibility, U1-D1 can use an exclusive
contract eﬀectively to purchase a monopoly right. The contract is hardly subtle, and such
blatant exclusion likely would catch the attention of antitrust authorities.
Matters are complicated further by downstream heterogeneity. If some consumers prefer
D2 ’s product, or are more cheaply served by D2, then a requirements contract that excludes
D2 obviously cannot fully maximize industry joint profits. Rather a fully eﬀective ex post
cartelization of the downstream industry would require coordinated pricing that divides the
downstream market eﬃciently. For example, if random downstream costs have diﬀerent
realizations for D1 and D2, then it is eﬃcient to assign final consumers to the low cost
firm. But if these uncertain downstream market conditions are non-contractible, then U1-
D1 would have the conflicting incentives both to exclude and not to exclude D2. U1-
D1 generally is unable both to divide the market eﬃciently and to fully extract rents
with a two-part tariﬀ that D2 would accept. Thus, the combination of uncertainty, non-
contractibility, and heterogeneity appear to create diﬃculties for ex post cartelization via
vertical integration and exclusive dealing.
To understand fully the relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing,
and Tirole, 2003). Alternatively, the upstream monopolist could solve the commitment problem by con-
tracting with a downstream firm exclusively. Our model shows that, when equally eﬃcient firms compete
in the upstream market, either full forward integration (with both downstream firms), or a combination of
partial vertical integration and exclusive dealing are needed to monopolize the downstream market (even
when contracts are public).
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therefore, it is important to go beyond the simple case of homogeneous downstream firms
and to study the relationship under conditions of downstream heterogeneity, uncertainty,
and noncontractibility. In what follows, we analyze a game-theoretic model of an industry
possessing these features. This analysis will make clear several points. First, the synergistic
relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing is not due to the extremely
vigorous nature of potential downstream competition between identical producers; rather, it
holds more generally in the presence of heterogeneous downstream firms who possess some
degree of market power. Second, while the vertically integrated firm has the incentive and
ability to exclude upstream competition and cartelize the downstream market, its ability
to do so may be reduced with downstream heterogeneity and noncontractible uncertainty.
In particular, the fixed payment needed to persuade D2 to enter the exclusive contract
may not be small when downstream firms are heterogeneous,4 and only partial carteliza-
tion of the downstream industry is feasible when downstream monopoly prices vary with
non-contractible market conditions. Third, extending the model to multiple independent
downstream competitors, while maintaining the assumption of private bilateral contract-
ing, reveals that the degree of ex post cartelization of the downstream industry depends on
market concentration and on whether or not competition is localized. Fourth, the exclusive
contracts that a vertically integrated firm uses to cartelize the downstream industry are not
blatant antitrust violations. The vertically integrated firm subtly employs the marginal
wholesale price of a two part tariﬀ to raise the downstream price, and judicially employs
the fixed fee to distribute the rents from cartelization. Because a higher wholesale price
to downstream rivals also raises the opportunity cost of the vertically integrated firm itself,
the elimination of double marginalization is not an eﬃciency of vertical integration.
4This is despite a hidden bonus to D2 : Because the integrated firm treats foregone wholesale revenues as
an opportunity cost, both of the downstream firms oﬀer the final good at supra-competitive prices, which
provides another source of compensation to D2 for agreeing to the exclusivity.
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3. HETEROGENEOUS DOWNSTREAM FIRMS
In this section, we study the main model of the paper. After describing the model, we
consider a benchmark case in which an upstream monopolist is vertically integrated with
one of the downstream duopolists. We then introduce an equally eﬃcient non-integrated
upstream competitor, and proves that the vertically integrated firm profitably employs an
exclusive contract to achieve the same market outcome as in the upstream monopoly case,
except for the distribution of rents between the upstream and downstream industries. We
further show that exclusive contracts are irrelevant if the industries are vertically separated.
We complete this section by discussing what happens if the model is extended to allow
multiple independent downstream firms.
3.1. The Model
The key properties of the model are that the costs of supplying the downstream product
are uncertain, heterogeneous, and non-contractible, and requirements contracts are bilateral
and private. The model is patterned roughly on markets for cement and concrete markets.
Cement is a fixed proportions input into the production of concrete, and concrete producers
typically procure cement supplies under requirements contracts. The demand for ready-
mixed concrete is located at constructions sites that are diﬃcult to predict or specify in
contracts. Since delivered ready-mixed concrete requires a cement truck, transportation
costs evidently are important and idiosyncratic to the location of the construction sites.
The model captures these cost characteristics with a number of simplifying assumptions.
We revisit cement and concrete markets at the end, when we discuss applications.
There is a single consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1], who is interested in purchasing one unit
of a product.5 The consumer’s uncertain reservation value V has a cumulative distribution
function F (v) on support [v, v¯], where 0 ≤ v < v¯ <∞. The corresponding probability den-
sity function is f (v) > 0 for v ∈ [v, v¯]. The consumer’s uncertain reservation value gives
5 It is easy but cumbersome to extend the model to a finite number of consumers.
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rise to a well-behaved downward-sloping expected demand curve.6 The corresponding ex-
pected marginal revenue function is also smooth and downward sloping under the following









The downstream market contains two firms D1 and D2 with similar technologies. Each
combines a component input with other inputs whose cost is normalized to zero. Addi-
tionally, to sell to the consumer D1 incurs transportation costs τx and D2 incurs τ(1−x),
where τ > 0 is a fixed parameter, measuring the degree of ex post cost heterogeneity. Thus,
the transportation costs of the two firms are negatively correlated. This simple spatial cost
structure captures adequately the more general idea of uncertain cost heterogeneity.7
The downstream firms “bid” prices to the consumer, P1 and P2. At the time of bidding,
the firms know x but do not know the realization of V . The consumer’s reservation value
becomes known only after the downstream firms set prices. The consumer purchases the
lower priced product as long as that price is below the consumer’s realized reservation value
v, and nothing otherwise.
There are two upstream firms U1 and U2. Each can supply the component at the same
fixed cost c ≥ 0. Suppose that U1 and D1 are vertically integrated. U1 and U2 each
oﬀer D2 a contract requiring D2 to purchase exclusively from U1 or U2. The location of
the consumer becomes known after D2 commits to an exclusive supply relationship, but
before downstream price competition. At the contract oﬀer stage, x is uncertain and has
a standard uniform distribution. Thus D1 and D2 are equally eﬃcient ex ante, but have
heterogeneous costs ex post.
Consumer characteristics, x and v, are not contractible. The supply contracts are as-
6We could replace the assumption of a random V with the assumption that the consumer has a conven-
tional downward sloping demand curve.
7The model could be extended to assume that the delivered costs of the two products have a more general
bivariate distribution. Alternatively, if the “transportation cost” is incurred directly by the consumer, as
often assumed in spatial models of consumer preferences, then the parameter τ measures the degree of
horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
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sumed to take the form of a two-part tariﬀ, specifying a fixed transfer payment from D2
to Ui, ti, and a price ri that D2 pays contingent on actual production.8 The integrated
U1-D1 cannot commit to any internal transfer price that is not ex post jointly optimal, nor
can anyone commit to a retail price through the supply contracts. The exclusive supplier
produces the component only if D2 succeeds in the downstream market.9 The implicit
assumption justifying this approach is that the transaction costs of determining the realiza-
tion of x, and making the contract depend on this determination, are prohibitively high.10
The consumer’s reservation value is never observed publicly, although it is easy to write a
contract contingent on production resulting from the consumer’s purchase decision.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1. U1 and U2 oﬀer contracts (t1, r1) and (t2, r2).
Stage 2. D2 chooses a contract.
Stage 3. x is realized.
Stage 4. D1 and D2 choose prices.
Stage 5. V is realized and the consumer makes a purchase decision.
We assume that contracting actions at Stages 1 and 2 are private.11 This game of
8The two-part tariﬀ allows an upstream firm to cartelize the downstream market by raisng the price
of the intermediate good (r) above cost (c), while extracting rents with the fixed fee (t). If there were a
large number of multiple consumers, then the fixed fee could be reinterpreted as a discount on inframarginal
units of the product. Thus a cartelizing contract involves quantity premia. In practice, there are various
concessions an integrated firm can make to compensate downstream firms for accepting non-competitive
intermediate goods prices. For example, it is common for a manafacturer to provide fixed payments to
retailers for promotional actitivities. See also the discussion of cases in the concluding section.
9Note that ti > 0 means that D2 pays a fee to Ui while ti < 0 means the opposite; and that, if a contract
is accepted, ti is paid irrespective of whether any sale is made, but ri is paid only if D2 actually makes a
sale.
10A conceivable possibility, for example, is that contract terms depend on messages exchanged after x is
realized, in the spirit of the Nash implementation literature (Maskin, 1985). We implicitly assume that the
transactions costs associated with the necessary message game are prohibitively burdensome. Alternatively,
such communication between downstream competitors might be construed to violate the antitrust laws.
11Our main results also hold if contracts are bilateral and public. However, if binding multilateral contracts
were feasible, then vertical integration would not be a necessary ingredient of cartelization (Mathewson and
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imperfect information raises a subtle issue about beliefs. As will become clear, there is no
(perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in which D2 contracts with U2. Accordingly, suppose in
a candidate equilibrium that D2 accepts U1 ’s contract oﬀer. If D2 were to deviate and
reject U1 ’s oﬀer, naturally U1 ( and D1) should believe that D2 has accepted a contract
from U2. But then what should D1 believe about the terms of that contract? D1 ’s belief
about D2 ’s wholesale price (r˜2) is important for the subgame equilibrium at Stage 4 when
the downstream firms compete on price, and thus matters for what U1 must oﬀer at Stage
1 to gain D2’s agreement. We assume that D1 believes r˜2 = c.12. We provide a rationale
for this refinement later, after we have introduced more ideas and notation.
Remark 1 The game form ignores the possibility that D2 might decline any exclusive con-
tract and instead purchase on a spot market after learning x. A spot market is irrelevant
because in equilibrium U2 oﬀers a requirements contract on terms that are the same as
would prevail in the spot market. The spot market price would be c (Hart and Tirole,
1990), providing no advantage compared to U2’s contract oﬀer.
We further refine equilibria by requiring that D1 and D2 do not set prices below their
costs at Stage 4, and U2 does not oﬀer a contract at Stage 1 that would be unprofitable if
accepted by D2. Thus we confine our attention to equilibrium strategies with the property
that a player never strictly prefers her oﬀer to be rejected, whether in Stage 1 or in Stage 4
of the game. This property is implied by the stronger requirement that players do not use
weakly dominated strategies. But that refinement is too strong for our purposes, because
it would eliminate all pure strategy equilibria.13
Winter, 1984). The rationale for the private contracting assumption is developed by Cremer and Riordan
(1987), Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Rey and
Tirole (2003).
12Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rey and Tirole (2003) do not discuss the issue, but implicitly make the same
assumption in their analyses of upstream competition when one firm is vertically integrated.
13This is familiar from other games with infinitely many strategies, e.g. the Bertrand duopoly with cost
assymetry (Kreps, 1990, p. 419, footnote d).
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3.2 Upstream monopoly
We start our analysis by considering the situation where U1 is the only supplier in the
upstream market, and modify Stage 1 accordingly. In particular, if D2 rejects U1 ’s contract
oﬀer at Stage 1, then D1 operates as an unconstrained monopolist. This model provides a
benchmark and establishes some preliminary results for our analysis of upstream duopoly.
As there are only two functioning firms, U1-D1 and D2, neither the exclusivity nor the
privacy of contracts is an issue in the case of vertically-integrated upstream monopoly.
Suppose that D2 accepts the contract (t1, r1) from U1. Let p = Pm1 (x) maximize
{(p− c− τx) [1− F (p)]} and p = Pm2 (x, r1) maximize {(p− r1 − τ(1− x)) [1− F (p)]} .
These are monopoly prices that each downstream firm would oﬀer consumer x in the ab-
sence of competition from the other. For any given x and r1, Pm1 (x) and P
m
2 (x, r1) exist
uniquely and satisfy:
Pm1 (x)− c− τx =
1− F (Pm1 (x))
f (Pm1 (x))
, (1)
Pm2 (x, r1)− r1 − τ (1− x) =
1− F (Pm2 (x, r1))
f (Pm2 (x, r1))
, (2)
where we define 1−F (p)f(p) = 0 if p > v¯. It is also clear that {(p− c− τx) [1− F (p)]} increases
in p for p < Pm1 (x) and decreases in p for p > P
m
1 (x). These monopoly prices are increasing,
and corresponding monopoly profits are decreasing, in marginal costs. Given the regularity
assumption A1, we then have:
Lemma 1 (i) Pm1 (x) increases in x and P
m
1 (x)− c− τx decreases in x. (ii) Assume that
Pm2 (x, r1) < v¯. Then, P
m
2 (x, r1) increases in r1 and decreases in x, and P
m
2 (x, r1) − r1 −
τ(1− x) decreases in r1 and increases in x.
We will also make use of the additional technical assumption:
A2. Pm1 (0) ≥ c+ τ .
A2 is satisfied if the likely values of V are not too small relative to c+ τ . The assumption
implies that, if r = c, then U2’s willingness to supply at price equal to cost always constrains
U1 ’s monopoly power. This fact is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
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For any contract (t1, r1) that is accepted byD2 and for any x, there is an ensuing subgame
where D1 and D2 bid prices to the consumer, and the consumer makes a purchase decision.
Now define:
P1(x, r1) = min {Pm1 (x), r1 + τ(1− x)} , (3)
P2(x, r1) = min {Pm2 (x, r1),min{Pm1 (x) , r1 + τx}} . (4)





≥ r1 + 12τ . If U1 is the sole upstream supplier, then the
following is a Nash equilibrium of the D1-D2 pricing subgame: If x ≤ 12 , then D1 oﬀers
P1(x, r1), D2 oﬀers r1 + τ(1 − x), and the customer selects D1. If x > 12 , then D2 oﬀers
P2(x, r1), D1 oﬀers min{Pm1 (x) , r1 + τx}, and the customer selects D2.
P roof. See Appendix C.
Given r1, P1 (x, r1) and P2 (x, r1) are the respective equilibrium prices when x ≤ 12 and
x > 12 . The logic behind the construction of these two prices is as follows: D1’s opportunity
cost of making a sale (excluding τx), when the sale would have been made by D2, is
r1 − c + c = r1. When x < 12 , D1 is the low-cost supplier since τx < τ (1− x). Bertrand
competition means that D1 will set its price either at its monopoly level or at the marginal
cost of D2, r1 + τ (1− x) , whichever is smaller. When x > 12 , D2 becomes the low-cost
supplier. D1 is willing to lower its price to its marginal opportunity cost r1 + τx, or, if
r1 + τx > P
m
1 (x) , to its monopoly price P
m
1 (x) so that the probability of a sale will not
be unprofitably low. Bertrand competition means that D2 will set its price either at its
monopoly price or at min{Pm1 (x) , r1 + τx}, whichever is smaller.
The equilibrium prices in Lemma 2 are similar to those under Bertrand competition for
a duopoly with diﬀerent constant marginal costs, say c1 < c2, where the equilibrium price
is c2. Although both sellers charging a price p ∈ (c1, c2) can also be supported as a Nash
equilibrium, seller 2 would prefer not to be selected as the supplier at such a price. Thus, if
we require that a seller should not strictly prefer to be rejected at the price it bids, the only
equilibrium in our pricing game between D1 and D2 is the one characterized in Lemma 2. In
what follows, we consider this as the unique (refined) equilibrium in the pricing subgame.14
14Notice that mixed strategy equilibria can be ruled out by standard arguments.
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Returning to the entire game, we have






≥ r1 + 12τ .
P roof. See Appendix C.
Remark 2 Lemma 3 also holds if D2 has some outside option for obtaining the input.
















[P2(x, r)− τ(1− x)− r] [1− F (P2(x, r))] dx (6)
Notice that Π(r) is the joint upstream-downstream industry profit when D2 contracts to
purchase from U1 at unit price r, and t (r) is the transfer price that fully extracts rents
from the downstream industry. We can now characterize the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1 The game where U1 is the only upstream supplier has a unique equilibrium.




, which is accepted by D2, where
rˆ = arg max
c≤r≤v¯ {Π(r)} , tˆ = t (rˆ) .
D1 is the seller with price P1(x, rˆ) if x ≤ 12 , and D2 is the seller with price P2(x, rˆ) if x > 12 .






P roof. See Appendix C.
The equilibrium contract has a cartelizing eﬀect. By charging D2 a wholesale markup
(rˆ−c), U1 raises D2’s marginal cost directly, creating an incentive for D2 to raise its prices.
Thus, D2 sells at a higher price when x ≥ 1/2, and is less of a competitive constraint on D1
13
when x < 1/2. The markup also raises U1-D1’s opportunity cost, creating an incentive
for D1 to raise its prices and be less of a competitive constraint on D2 when x ≥ 1/2 and
Pm2 (x, rˆ) > rˆ+ τx. The overall eﬀect is to lessen horizontal competition in the downstream
market and to reduce consumer welfare, relative to the situation where the wholesale price
for D2 is c.15
The cartelization of the industry, however, is only partial, due to the assumption that x
is not contractible. Full cartelization requires a monopoly price for all values of x. To see
this, first consider the consumer at x = 1, where
P2 (1, rˆ) = min {Pm2 (1, rˆ),min{Pm1 (1) , rˆ + τx}} > Pm1 (0)
since Pm2 (1, rˆ) > P
m




1 (1) > P
m
1 (0) , and rˆ + τx > P
m
1 (0). Therefore, for
consumers suﬃciently close to x = 1, we must have P2 (x, rˆ) > Pm1 (1− x) , or the price is
above the vertically-integrated industry monopoly level. Thus, there is a problem of double
marginalization when cost heterogeneity is greatest. Next, consider consumers at or slightly







− 12τ from Proposition 1, we have
P1 (x, rˆ) < P
m
1 (x) , or the price is below the vertically-integrated industry monopoly level,
i.e. there is a problem of excessive horizontal competition when the downstream firms have
similar costs.
The obstacle to full cartelization is non-contractibility, i.e. contract terms do not vary
with the location of the final consumer. This fact creates a tension between improving verti-
cal eﬃciency in some circumstances and intensifying horizontal competition in others. The
conflict arises in our model from the downward-sloping expected demand curve generated
by the consumer’s uncertain reservation price. A lower value of rˆ causes lower downstream
prices by reducing D2 ’s marginal cost as well as U1 -D1’s marginal opportunity cost. Thus,
U1 faces a trade-oﬀ in setting r1. Reducing r1 alleviates D2 ’s double marginalization prob-
15 It is important for our result that U1-D1 takes an integrated view of its operations and coordinates
its upstream-downstream prices to maximize the integrated firm’s expected profit. In our context, if this
were not true, there would be no diﬀerence between a pair of vertically integrated or separated firms. The
strategic incentives and eﬀects can still be present, albeit to a less extent, if the interests of U1 and D1 are
not completely harmonized under vertical integration.
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lem at some locations, but also intensifies horizontal price competition elsewhere. If rˆ is
reduced, neither U1 -D1 nor D2 can commit not to undercut each other for the consumer
that is located closer to the rival. The problem is that downstream monopoly prices vary
with the location of the consumer; and the single instrument rˆ cannot achieve these prices
in all circumstances.
3.3. Upstream Duopoly
We now return to the model where the upstream market is a duopoly. Recall that the
contracts oﬀered by U1 and U2 are denoted by (t1, r1) and (t2, r2), and U1 -D1 does not
observe the contract oﬀer that U2 makes to D2. As we assumed earlier, if D2 accepts
U2 ’s contract oﬀ the equilibrium path, U1 -D1 believe that r˜2 = c. The following lemma
shows that this is implied by the belief that U2 and D2 have negotiated a contract that
maximizes their joint profit.
Lemma 4 Suppose that U2 is the contracted supplier of D2. For any D1’s belief r˜2, U2
and D2’s joint profit is maximized when r2 = c.
P roof. For any consumer x ∈ [0, 1] and any price strategy adopted by D1, P˜1 (x, r˜2) ,
D2 will be the seller to x if
P˜1 (x, r˜2) > r2 + τ (1− x) ,
and D2 will charge P˜1 (x, r˜2) for these consumers. Define
S2 (r2) =
n
x ∈ [0, 1] : P˜1 (x, r˜2) > r2 + τ (1− x)
o
,
then S2 (r2) is the set of consumers D2 sells to. (D2 may also sell to any consumer with
x being such that P˜1 (x, r˜2) = r2 + τ (1− x) , but including these consumers in S2 (r2) will
not change our argument.) The joint profits of U2 and D2 , when U2 chooses r2 while D1
holds the belief r˜2, are





















dx = Π2 (c | r˜2) ,
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where the inequality is due to the fact that if r2 > c, a reduction of r2 to c potentially
increases profitable sales for D2; and if r2 < c, an increase of r2 to c potentially reduces
negative-profit sales for D2.
Thus, the only belief of D1 that is consistent with joint profit-maximization by U2 and
D2 is r˜2 = c. Choosing r2 = c is U2-D2’s weakly dominant strategy, much like that in
a second-price auction bidding her true value is each bidder’s weakly dominant strategy.
Here, the true marginal cost to U2-D2 is c. For any P˜1 (x, r˜2) , choosing r2 6= c will only
cause D2 to use the wrong marginal cost in competing with D1, causing D2 either not to
make sales at prices that are above the true marginal cost or to make sales at prices that
are below the true marginal cost.
Remark 3 U1 must have correct beliefs in equilibrium. Therefore, the lemma implies that,
if D2 contracts with U2 in an equilibrium, then D1’s belief must be r˜2 = c.
If D2 contracts with U2, and U1 believes that r˜2 = c, then the profits anticipated by
U1 -D1 and by U2 -D2 are:Z 1
2
0




τ(2x− 1) [1− F (c+ τx)] dx.
On the other hand, if D2 contracts with U1, since rˆ > c from Proposition 1, we have


















τ(1− 2x) [1− F (c+ τ(1− x))] dx > 0,
the competition between U1 and U2 must mean that in equilibrium, D2 will contract with









τ(2x−1) [1− F (c+ τx)] dx. (7)
Notice that when r1 increases, P2(x, r1) is either unchanged when P2(x, r1) = Pm1 (x) , or
increases otherwise; and it can be verified that there will be some interval on (12 , 1] on which
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τ(2x−1) [1− F (c+ τx)] dx = 0.
Furthermore, since r∗1 = rˆ, the downstream equilibrium outcome is the same as under
upstream monopoly. We have thus shown:
Proposition 2 The game where the upstream market is a duopoly has a unique equilibrium.
At this equilibrium, U2 oﬀers D2 (0, c) and U1 oﬀers D2 (t∗1, r∗1) , where r∗1 = rˆ, D2 contracts
with U1, and the downstream equilibrium outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly.
Thus, a vertically integrated firm is able to outbid a stand-alone supplier for an exclusive
relationship with a downstream competitor. When the integrated firm supplies D2 at a
price above marginal cost, the former has less incentive to undercut D2 because of the
opportunity cost of foregone input sales to D2. This dampening of horizontal competition
explains U1 ’s advantage and ability to preemptU2 (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).16 Because
of downstream heterogeneity, the profitable exclusion of U2 may nevertheless cost U1-D1
a substantial amount. However, this cost approaches zero as the diﬀerence between D1




τ(2x − 1) [1− F (c+ τx)] dx = 0 imply
limτ→0 t∗1 = 0.
Remark 4 U1’s out-of-equilibrium belief r˜2 = c matters for equilibrium value of t∗1, but not
otherwise for an equilibrium outcome. For example, if U1 believed r˜2 > c out of equilibrium,
then downstream price competition would be less aggressive if U2 were to deviate and accept
U2’s oﬀer, and the fixed payment t1 needed to gain D2’s compliance correspondingly would
be less. Nevertheless, U1-D1 would still have an incentive to maximize joint profits by
setting r1 = rˆ. Thus the refinement is not crucial for the equilibrium cartelization result.
The exclusion of upstream competition leads to higher downstream prices compared to
when U2 supplies D2. The exclusivity of the contract clearly is important for the carteliza-
16While we have assumed for simplicity that U1 and U2 are equally eﬃcient, the same logic would hold,
and so would Proposition 2, if U2 had a small eﬃciency advantage. In this case, however, U1-D1 would
have an incentive to ”outsource” supplies of the input from the more eﬃcient U2.
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tion outcome under vertical integration. Since rˆ > c, D2 would want to purchase from U2
ex post as long as r2 < rˆ, and U2 would be willing to cut r2 to as low as c to gain D2 ’s busi-
ness. This implies that, if upstream firms cannot sign exclusive contracts with downstream
firms, perhaps due to legal restrictions or to diﬃculties in contract enforcement, then the
input price to D2 must be set at r1 = r2 = c, with t1 = t2 = 0. Therefore:
Remark 5 In the game where the upstream market is a duopoly, the cartelization of the
downstream market can be achieved only if exclusive requirements contracts are feasible.
3.4. Vertical Separation
Earlier, we showed that exclusive contracts used by a vertically integrated firm can achieve
the market outcome of an upstreammonopolist. To see that vertical integration is important
for the cartelization eﬀect of the exclusive contracts, we next consider a variation of our
model in which U1 and D1 are vertically separated independent firms. We shall show
that exclusive contracts are irrelevant in this case: the equilibrium input price for both
downstream firms is c.
The timing of the modified game is as follows:
Stage 1. U1 and U2 each oﬀer separate contracts to D1 and D2.17
Stage 2. D1 and D2 choose contracts.
Stage 3. x is realized.
Stage 4. D1 and D2 choose prices.
Stage 5. V is realized and the consumer makes a purchase decision.
A contract oﬀer from Ui to Dj is transfer payment and intermediate goods price, (tij , rij)
for i, j = 1, 2. Adapting our notation, we let (tj , rj) now denote any contract that Dj
accepts, whether oﬀered by U1 or U2. We continue to assume that contracting actions at
Stages 1 and 2 are private. That is, Dj does not observe the contract oﬀers made to Di.
17To be consistent with our earlier analysis, we again assume that these are exclusive contracts requiring
a downstream firm to purchase only from a certain upstream firm, although exclusive contracts are not
necessary for our result that the intermediate-good price will be equal to c under vertical separation.
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Unlike under the vertical integration of U1 and D1, where D1 always knows D2 ’s marginal
cost when the latter contracts with U1 and D2 always knows the marginal cost of D1,
under vertical separation additional issues arise about beliefs when contracts are private.
In particular, now when Dj receives an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer, there is the issue of what
it should believe about Di’s contract terms. We impose the equilbrium refinement that
downstream firms hold “symmetry beliefs” after receiving an out-of-equilibrium contract
oﬀer. In a symmetry beliefs equilibrium, Dj believes that Di is oﬀered and accepts the
same out-of-equilibrium oﬀer.
Vertical separation and symmetry beliefs yield a competitive outcome in the upstream
market. This contrasts with the cartelization outcome under vertical integration.





for j = 1, 2. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium with ri > c for any i = 1, 2.
P roof. See Appendix C.
Remark 6 We have not ruled out equilibria with ri < c. Any such symmetric equilibrium
would be Pareto dominated for the industry by an equilibrium with ri = c. The proposition
is suﬃcient to establish that importance of vertical integration for the cartelization of the
downstream industry.
If both D1 and D2 were to contract only with U1 at input prices above c, then down-
stream prices would be higher and joint upstream-downstream industry profits would also
be higher. Therefore, one might then conjecture that in equilibrium U1 would be able
to use exclusive contracts to cartelize the downstream industry as in the case of vertical
integration. So why is this not the case in the absence of vertical integration? The reason
is that one of the downstream firms can pair with U2 at a lower input price and, given
equilibrium beliefs, obtain a joint profit that is more than its joint profit with U1 under
the higher input price. This competitive option would frustate any attempt by U1 to use
exclusive contracts to cartelize the downstream industry, because it makes it too costly for
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an independent U1 to gain the compliance of both downstream firms. This reasoning is
made precise in Appendix C.
But why would U1 be able to contract with D2 at r2 > c when U1 and D1 are vertically
integrated? One way to think about the intuition is the following: Since U1 and D1 are
vertically integrated, D1 ’s pricing strategies depend on whether D2 purchases from U1 at
r2 > c. If D2 contracts to purchase from U1 at r2 > c, D1 would price less aggressively
in the downstream market, which leads to a higher joint upstream-downstream profits. If
instead D2 contracts to purchase from U2 at input price c, then both D1 and D2 will
compete with marginal cost c, resulting in lower upstream-downstream joint profits. This
implies that the joint profit D2 can possibly obtain by contracting with U2 will always be
below what U1 is willing to oﬀer D2 to sign it up for the exclusive contract.
It is noteworthy that the logic for the competitive contracting result under vertical sep-
aration depends on the presence of an equally eﬃcient upstream competitor.
Remark 7 In the case of upstream monopoly, symmetry beliefs resolve the upstream firm’s
commitment problem and support the integrated monopoly outcome (McAfee and Schwartz
1994; Rey and Tirole 2003).18
The symmetry beliefs refinement is not crucial for the competitive contracting outcome.
The same result also obtains under “passive beliefs” if c = 0, although otherwise a passive
beliefs equilibrium does not exist in our model. Under passive beliefs, Dj maintains the
belief that Di has accepted an equilibrium contract oﬀer even after receiving an out-of-
equilibrium oﬀer.19
18Other approaches yield competitive outcomes even in the case of upstream monopoly. O’Brien and
Shaﬀer (1992) obtain a competitive outcome in the case of upstream monopoly with the “contract equi-
librium” concept suggested by Cremer and Riordan (1987). This solution concept has been criticized by
McAfee and Schwartz (1995) and Rey and Tirole (2003) for ignoring multilateral devitions. Hart and Tirole
(1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Rey and Tirole (2003) obtain competitive outcomes in the case of
upstream monopoly by imposing the alternative refinement of passive beliefs.
19The literature on private bilateral contracting has studied both passive and symmetry beliefs, as well as
“wary beliefs”(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Rey and Tirole, 2003; Rey and Verge 2003). Under wary beliefs
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= (0, c) for j = 1, 2 is supported
by passive beliefs. If c > 0, then a passive beliefs equilibrium does not exist. The nonexis-
tence problem arises because U1 could profitably deviate from [0, c] and oﬀer D1 and D2 a
contract [t, r] with t > 0 and 0 < r < c. Each firm would think that it alone was being of-
fered the deviation contract and would be willing to pay for the competitive advantage. Thus
the upstream firm would profit essentially by fraudulently selling the competitive advantage
twice.20
Since r∗i = c for i = 1, 2, there is no need for exclusive contracts in equilibrium, and
firms have equilibrium incentives to negotiate supply arrangements on competitive terms,
i.e. exactly as they would in spot markets.
Remark 9 When U1 and D1 are vertically separated, exclusive contracts are irrelevant in
equilibrium with a competitive upstream outcome.
Finally, we can modify our arguments to show that our results in this and the previous
section hold if contracts are bilateral and public. The same is true for our results in the
extended models in the appendices. In this case out-of-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant.
a downstream firm who receives an out-of-equilibrium contract reasons that the upstream firm expects the
contract to be accepted and has oﬀered the rival downstream firm an acceptable contract that maximizes their
joint profits. Wary beliefs equilibria are diﬃcult to analyze because they implicitly involve a complicated
hierarchy of beliefs, e.g. D1 ’s belief about D2 ’s contract, D1 ’s belief about D2 ’s belief about D1 ’s contract,
et cetera.
20An alternative approach is impose the strategy restriction ri ≥ c, in which case a passive beliefs equilib-
rium exists and yields the competitive outcome. The strategy restriction might be justified by two diﬀerent
arguments. First, the restriction could be dispensed with by extending the model to include an outside
market for the upstream product with a competitive price equal to c. In this case, c is the opportunity cost
of diverting supplies from the outside market in order to supply the intermediate good to the downstream
market on which our analysis focuses. An implication is that a downstream firm could resell the intermedi-
ate good at a price of c, and this resale opportunity would make it unprofitable for an upstream firm ever
to oﬀer a contract with ri < c. Second, below-cost pricing might expose an upstream firm to a predatory
pricing suit, for which suﬃciently high penalties would be a deterrent.
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Remark 10 Proposition 3 (and our other main results) also holds if contracts are bilateral
and public. Multilateral public contracts would destroy the result. For instance, U1 could
oﬀer both D1 and D2 an r that maximizes the joint profits of U1-D1-D2, and if it could
further stipulate in the contract that it would reduce r to c if either firm declines the contract,
then the contract could be supported in equilibrium.
3.5. Extending to Multiple Downstream Firms
Our spatial model of downstream price competition is restrictive in that it only suits
the case of downstream duopoly; (our simplifying assumptions of upstream duopoly and a
single consumer are easily relaxed.) The logic of our results, however, is more general. In
Appendix A, we introduce a generalization of the model, in which n downstream competitors
are located at terminal nodes of a symmetric “hub and spoke” network and consumers are
distributed uniformly on the connected spokes.21 This “spokes model” is interesting because
it exhibits a strong form of non-localized competition;22 each downstream firm possesses
market power constrained by all other competitors, who are equidistant.23 In Appendix
B, we also analyze a standard circle model of localized competition (Salop, 1979).
Our main results generalize readily to the spokes model. With n > 2 downstream com-
21A key observation for the extension of our results to the spokes model of downstream oligopoly is
that prices are strategic complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). Thus, an exclusive
contract that raises the marginal input price to a downstream competitor has the benefit of encouraging
other downstream rivals to raise their prices also. These infectious eﬀects enable a vertically integrated
cartel organizer to achieve higher downstream prices by bringing the entire downstream industry under
exclusive contracts. The argument is related to Davidson and Deneckere’s (1985) analysis of incentives to
form coalitions.
22Non-localized competition means in general that a consumer may have first-choice preference over down-
stream products, but no strong second-choice preference, or, alternatively, a consumer has a most-eﬃcient
supplier of the downstream product, but other suppliers are equally eﬃcient. For example, consider a case
in which a consumer can buy from a single local supplier, or can buy over the Internet from more distant
suppliers. Non-localized competition also applies naturally to markets with consumer switching costs.
23This property is reminiscent of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition; individual firms have power
over price while competing against “the market”. See also Hart (1985a, 1985b) and Perloﬀ and Salop (1985).
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petitors, vertical integration combines with exclusive contracts to foreclose equally eﬃ-
cient upstream competition and raise downstream prices, and neither of the two practices
alone achieves these anticompetitive eﬀects. There is, however, an additional result from
the spokes model: the equilibrium upstream price under vertical integration decreases in
the number of downstream competitors. This suggests that market concentration in the
downstream market can be important for the evaluation of the combined eﬀects of vertical
integration and exclusive contracts.
Our results also extend to the circle model of localized competition. In the circle model,
the vertically integrated upstream firm only brings under exclusive contract its immediate
downstream neighbors, while contracting eﬃciently with more distant downstream firms.
Thus, in the case of four or more downstream firms, upstream competitors are excluded
only from supplying the portion of the downstream market that is local to the integrated
firm. Nevertheless, the combination of vertical integration and exclusive dealing has an
anticompetitive eﬀect in this local market segment.
Taken together, the spokes model and the circle model indicate that the extent of up-
stream foreclosure and downstream cartelization depends on the nature of (localized versus
non-localized) competition. We could consider a hybrid model in which the consumer lo-
cates on a spokes network with some probability and otherwise on a circle. We conjecture
that U1 -D1 would contract exclusively with all downstream competitors in the hybrid case,
setting intermediate goods prices that reflect the probability of non-localized competition.
Thus, the extent of downstream cartelization depends on the degree to which the integrated
firm is in direct competition with independent downstream competitors.
4. DISCUSSION
Our analysis has revealed a relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing
that has gone unnoticed in the economics literature. A vertically integrated firm has the
ability and incentive to use exclusive requirements contracts to eﬀect a cartelization of the
downstream industry. The ability of the vertically integrated firm to do so may be limited
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when downstream firms are heterogeneous and contracts cannot be contingent on uncertain
market conditions. In particular a complete cartelization remains elusive when downstream
monopoly prices vary with non-contractible market conditions. In such circumstances, the
extent to which a vertically integrated supplier is able to cartelize the downstream industry
depends on the degree of concentration in the downstream market and on the degree to
which downstream competition is localized.
Hart and Tirole (1990) made an important contribution to the vertical integration lit-
erature by showing how vertical integration enables an upstream monopolist to overcome
a commitment problem when contracts are private, and achieve an ex post monopoly out-
come in the downstream market. Rey and Tirole (2003) felicitously refer to this result as
“restoring” monopoly power. The essential logic is that a vertically integrated firm better
internalizes the opportunity cost of cutting supply prices to downstream rivals. The same
logic carries over if the upstream firm competes against inferior upstream rivals, although
the ability to achieve a full monopoly outcome is constrained by potential competition from
the less eﬃcient suppliers.
The Hart-Tirole-Rey theory does not explain an incentive for partial vertical integration
if the upstream rivals are equally eﬃcient. Our analysis shows that such an incentive
does exist if a vertically-integrated upstream firm has recourse to exclusive contracts. By
charging a higher marginal supply price to downstream rivals, the vertically integrated
supplier engineers a “more collusive” downstream outcome.24 The resulting increase in
industry profits is shared among market participants via lump sum transfers. In this way,
an enterprising upstream firm eﬀectively cartelizes the downstream industry.
Aghion and Bolton (1987) made an important contribution to the literature on exclusive
contracting by showing how penalty contracts could exclude an equally or more eﬃcient
entrant. Our analysis complements theirs by showing how a vertically integrated firm can
use exclusive contracts to exclude an equally or more eﬃcient firm who is already in the
24Chen (2001) has considered the collusive eﬀect of vertical mergers in a model that assumes linear pricing
and non-exclusive contracts between upstream and downstream firms. Similar to the Hart-Tirole-Rey theory,
there is no vertical merger in Chen if the upstream rivals are equally eﬃcient.
24
market. As suggested by the Chicago School, the exclusion of the upstream competitor is
costly to the integrated firm, i.e. transfer payments are needed to gain the acquiescence of
the downstream industry. But the necessary transfer payments are not so large as to make
ex post cartelization unprofitable for the vertically integrated upstream firm. Interestingly,
this cost approaches zero when the heterogeneity between downstream firms disappears:
the vertically integrated firm relies on cutting its downstream prices as a (hidden) threat
to persuade the independent downstream firms to accept the exclusive contract; this threat
provides the most powerful incentive, and hence there is little need for explicit transfer
payment, when the downstream producers become perfect substitute for each other.
If our theory is to be useful for policies concerning vertical mergers and/or exclusive
contracts, it must be supported by evidence on market structure. Our analysis suggests
the following relevant evidence:
• Sole source requirements contracting is a normal industry practice or at least has some
industry precedent. Otherwise, the theory might be judged as too speculative about
post-merger industry conduct.
• Downstream price competition is “tough” before the vertical merger or before the
adoption of exclusive contracts by a vertically integrated firm, as would be the case
if the firms have similar capabilities/products and were not colluding tacitly (Sutton,
1991). Otherwise, there may be little to gain from cartelization via exclusive con-
tracts, or the vertically-integrated firm might be unable to exclude an equally eﬃcient
upstream competitor.
• The vertically-integrated firm is likely to have substantial excess capacity or can ex-
pand capacity easily. Otherwise, the integrated firm is unlikely to be able to supply
other downstream firms on competitive terms.
• The downstream market is concentrated, and there are barriers to entry. Otherwise,
the cartelization eﬀect is small relative to the size of the market, or would be undone
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by new entry.25
• Evidence in favor of a plausible eﬃciency theory should be weighed against evidence
in support of an anticompetitive eﬀect (Riordan and Salop, 1995).26
We close by discussing briefly two antitrust cases to illustrate the empirical relevance of
our ideas. One case is Kodak v. F.T.C. (1925). Kodak had a 90% market share for raw
cinematic film that it supplied to downstream picture-makers. Kodak acquired capacity
to enter the downstream industry, and reached essentially an exclusive-dealing agreement
with picture-makers in which it agreed not to deploy the capacity if picture-makers would
refrain from purchasing imported raw film. The Court found this agreement to be an illegal
restraint of trade.
Another case is TEKAL/ITALCEMENTI (A76), brought up by the Italian Antitrust
Authority against Italcementi, the main cement manufacturer in Sardinia, Italy.27 Faced
with lower-priced competition from imported cement, Italcementi acquired ten concrete
production facilities between April and June 1993, and began to sell its concrete at prices
below variable cost, with the intention of dissuading the independent concrete producers
from purchasing their cement from importers. It was then able to enter into contractual
agreements with some main concrete purchasing companies that eﬀectively excluded other
concrete producers. The Italian Antitrust Authority ruled that the conduct of Italcementi
was part of an overall plan to restrict access to the Sardinian cement market and constituted
an abuse of dominant position, and it fined the company 3,750 billion lire.
While these two cases occurred in diﬀerent times, countries, and industries,28 the strate-
25Market definition is a key issue when competition is localized. Sales to customer groups with few real
alternatives may constitute a distinct product market.
26For example, if the upstream competition were “soft”, as would be the case if the upstream firms colluded
expressly or tacitly, and if uniform pricing were the normal pre-merger industry practice, then the merger
arguably might increase economic eﬃciency by eliminating a double markup.
27The discussion of this case is based on Italian Antitrust Authority Annual Report 1994, published on
April 30, 1995. We thank Pierluigi Sabbatini of the Italian Antitrust Authority for directing our attention
to this case.
28 Interestingly, there is a case similar to TEKAL/ITALCEMENTI (A76) in New Zealand, concerning a
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gic considerations involved in both of them are remarkably similar to those in our theory. In
both cases, a vertically integrated upstream producer entered into exclusive contracts with
independent downstream firms that excluded other upstream firms from market access. The
independent downstream firms appeared to be willing to accept such arrangements because
the integrated upstream producer used its downstream facilities to entice and discipline the
independents: if the independents purchased inputs from the vertically integrated upstream
producer, the vertically integrated downstream producer would compensate the indepen-
dents by reducing or refraining from competition; otherwise it would aggressively cut prices.
As a result, the vertically integrated firm was able to exclude upstream competitors and
likely also raised downstream prices. We also notice that the key features of our model
are possibly present in the cases. In particular, for TEKAL/ITALCEMENTI (A76), the
diﬀerent downstream concrete producers likely had diﬀerent shipping costs for consumers
at diﬀerent locations; downstream market condition was likely to be uncertain in that the
location and the demand of a final customer might be unknown ex ante; and pricing con-
tracts between a cement (upstream) producer and a concrete (downstream) producer did
not appear to be contingent on the locations of final consumers.
Although the details of the two cases are diﬀerent from our theoretical model, they do
illustrate the empirical relevance of our argument that vertical integration raises heightened
concerns about exclusive dealing and vice versa.
vertically integrated cement/concrete company, Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure Limited, whose pricing
behavior in the concrete market has the purpose and eﬀect of excluding competition in the cement market
and (eventually) raising concrete prices. In 2002, the New Zealand Commerce Commission investigated the
case and issued a warning to the company for risking antitrust violation.
27
REFERENCES
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1987). Contracts as a Barrier to Entry. American Economic
Review 77:388-401.
[2] Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1998). Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Political Economy
106: 64-103.
[3] Bork, R. H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. New York: Basic Books
[4] Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos, and P. Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic
Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy 93: 488-511.
[5] Chen, Y. (2001). On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Eﬀects. RAND Journal of
Economics 32: 667-685.
[6] Choi, J.P. and S.-S. Yi. (2000). Vertical Foreclosure and the Choice of Input Specifications.
RAND Journal of Economics 31: 717-743.
[7] Church, J. and N. Gandal, (2000). Systems Foreclosure, Vertical Mergers, and Foreclosure.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 9: 25-52.
[8] Cremer, J. and M. H. Riordan, (1987). On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilat-
eral Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics 18: 436-451.
[9] Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson. (1985). Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Com-
petition. Rand Journal of Economics 16: 473—486.
[10] Gilbert, R. J. and Newbery, D. M. (1982). Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly, American Economic Review 72: 514-526.
[11] Hart, O.D. (1985a). Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General
Model. Review of Economic Studies 52: 529-546.
28
[12] _____(1985b). Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results.
Economic Journal 95:889-908.
[13] Hart, O. and Tirole, J. (1990). Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity (Special Issue) 205-276.
[14] Kreps, David. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press.
[15] McAfee, P. and M. Schwartz. (1994). Opportunism in Multilateral Contracting: Nondis-
crimination, Exclusivity and Uniformity. American Economic Review 84: 210-30.
[16] McAfee, P. and M. Schwartz. (1995). The Non-existence of Pairwise-proof Equilibrium.
Economic Letters 49: 251-259.
[17] Maskin, E. (1985) The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in Social Goals and
Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner, 173—204, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge UK.
[18] Mathewson, G. F. and R.Winter (1984), An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, RAND
Journal of Economics, 15, 27-38.
[19] O’Brien, D. and G. Shaﬀer (1992). Vertical Control and Bilateral Contracts. RAND Journal
of Economics 23: 299-308.
[20] Ordover, J., G. Saloner, and S. Salop (1990). Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure. American
Economic Review 80: 127-142.
[21] Ordover, J., G. Saloner, and S. Salop (1992). Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply.
American Economic Review, 82: 698-703.
[22] Perloﬀ, J. M., Salop, S. C. (1985). Equilibrium with Product Diﬀerentiation. Review of
Economic Studies, 52, pp. 107-120.
[23] Rasmusen, E., J. Ramseyer, and J. Wiley. (1991). Naked Exclusion. American Economic
Review 81: 1137-45.
29
[24] Reiﬀen, D. (1992). Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment, American Economic Re-
view, 82: 695-697.
[25] Riordan, M. (1998). Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm. American
Economic Review, 88: 1232-48.
[26] Riordan, M. and. S. Salop (1995). Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach.
Antitrust Law Journal, 63: 513-568.
[27] Rey, P. and J. Tirole (2003). A Primer on Foreclosure. mimeo, forthcoming in Handbook of
Industrial Organization III, edited by M. Armstrong and R. Porter.
[28] Rey, P. and T. Verge (2003). Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts. mimeo.
[29] Salop, S.C. (1979). ”Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 10: 141-156.
[30] Segal, I. and M. Whinston (2000). Naked Exclusion: Comment. American Economic Review
90: 296-309.
[31] Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk Costs and Market Structure. London: MIT Press.
30
APPENDIX A: “SPOKES” MODEL
We develop a new model of price competition by multiple downstream firms that is a
natural extension of the duopoly model. In addition to extending our results, the model
may also have independent interest in suggesting a new way of modeling non-localized price
competition by diﬀerentiated oligopolists. To save space, we shall make our arguments
mostly informally; and, while we continue to assume that contracts are bilateral and private,
we will focus on symmetry beliefs, under which equilibrium always exists. The equilibrium
outcomes would be the same under passive beliefs whenever equilibrium exists, but the
existence of equilibrium under passive beliefs requires the restrictive assumption that c = 0
or that for some reason downstream firms cannot set r < c.29
Suppose that the downstream has n ≥ 2 firms, D1,D2, ...Dn.As before, D1 and U1 are
vertically integrated. Each Di is associated with a line of length 12 , li. The two ends of li are
called origins and terminals, respectively. Firm Di is located at the origin of li, and the lines
are so arranged that all the terminals meet at one point, the center. This forms a network
of lines connecting competing firms (“spokes”), and a firm can supply the consumer only
by traveling on the lines. Ex ante, the consumer is located at any point of this network
with equal probabilities. The realized location of the consumer is fully characterized by a
vector (li, xi), which means that the consumer is on li with distances of xi to Di and of
1
2 − xi + 12 = 1− xi to Dj, j 6= i.30 Obviously, the linear duopoly model is a special case of
the spokes model with n = 2.
As in our earlier analysis, consider first the case where U1 is a monopolist in the upstream
market. A contract oﬀered by U1 to Dj, j = 2, ...n, can be written as (tj, rj). Modifying
29Earlier, when D1 and D2 are the only two downstream firms, the vertical integration of U1 and D1
makes private contracting essentially the same as public contracting, since D1 would always know U1 ’s oﬀer
to D2 and D2 would always know the transfer price from U1 to D1 is c.With several vertically independent
downstream firms, private contracting potentially becomes a constraint even under the vertical integration
of U1 and D1.








equations (1) and (2), we can define Pm1 (x1) and P
m
j (xj , rj) as satisfying
Pm1 (x1)− c− τx1 =
1− F (Pm1 (x1))
f (Pm1 (x1))
, (1’)
Pmj (xj , rj)− rj − τxj =
1− F
³




Pmj (xj , rj)
´ , j = 2, ..., n. (2’)
Let r¯ ≡ min{rj : j = 2, ..., n}. Modifying equations (3) and (4) in Section 3, for i = 1, ..., n
and j = 2, ..., n, we can define
P1((li, xi), r¯) =
 min {P
m
1 (x1), r¯ + τ(1− x1)} if i = 1
min{Pm1 (1− xi) , r¯ + τ(1− xi)} if i 6= 1
, (3’)
Pj((li, xi), rj, r¯) = min
n
Pmj (xj, rj),max{rj + τxj ,min{Pm1 (1− xj), r¯ + τ(1− xj)}}
o
if i = j
rj + τ(1− xi) if i 6= j
.(4’)
Then, extending Lemma 2, in any downstream pricing game following any given {(tj , rj) : j = 2, ..., n} ,
there is a unique (refined) equilibrium outcome,31 in whichD1 sets P1((li, xi), r¯) and Dj sets
Pj((li, xi), rj , r¯), with the equilibrium price for consumer (li, xi) being




1 (x1), r¯ + τ(1− x1)} if i = 1
min {Pmi (xi, ri),max{ri + τxi,min{Pm1 (1− xi) , r¯ + τ(1− xi)}} if i 6= 1
;
consumer (li, xi) selects D1 if i = 1 or if i 6= 1 but min{Pm1 (1− xi) , r¯+τ(1−xi)} < ri+τxi;
and consumer (li, xi) selects Di if i 6= 1 and min{Pm1 (1− xi) , r¯+ τ(1−xi)} ≥ ri+ τxi. As






≥ ri + 1
2
τ
for any equilibrium contract (ti, ri) .
The presence of additional downstream firms introduces several issues that we must con-
sider in extending the analysis leading to Proposition 1.
31As in standard Bertand competition with more than two firms, the strategy profile supporting the unique
equilibrium ouctome may not be unique.
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First, it is now possible that rj 6= rk for some j, k = 2, ..., n and j 6= k. Suppose that
rk = r¯ < rj for some j = 2, ..., n; i.e., Dk has a cost advantage in supplying (lj , xj) when
rk+ τ(1−xj) < rj + τxj. But Dk cannot benefit from selling to such a consumer, since the
competition from D1 will drive the price down to min {Pm1 (1− xj), rk + τ(1− xj)} ≤ rk+
τ(1−xj). This is because the perceived marginal cost for D1 in supplying such a consumer
when Dk is the other potential supplier and purchases from U1 at rk, is c+ rk − c = rk.
Second, it immediately follows that to maximize joint upstream-downstream industry
profits, we must have (tj , rj) = (t, r) for j = 2, ..., n; because, if rk < rj for some j 6= k,
then slightly lowering rj has no eﬀect on the competition for consumer (li, xi), i 6= j but
increases the expected industry profit from consumer (lj, xj). This allows us to generalize





















[P2 (x, r)− τx− r] [1− F (P2 (x, r))] dx, (6’)
where Π(r) is the joint industry profits when (tj , rj) = (t (r) , r) for all j = 2, ...n. The
transfer t (r) fully extracts rents from the downstream industry.
Notice that an increase in r has the similar trade oﬀ here as in the downstream duopoly
case: it aﬀects positively the profit for D1 due to relaxed competition, but aﬀects negatively
the profits for each Dj if it worsens the double mark-up distortion. Since the second eﬀect
is more important with a higher n, we conclude that rˆ decreases in n, where
rˆ = arg max
c≤r≤v¯
{Π(r)} .





− 12τ , and define tˆ = t (rˆ).





Dj, j = 2, ..., n and these oﬀers are accepted, we need to check that U1 would not benefit
from a deviation that privately oﬀers diﬀerent contracts to one or several Dj.
33




. It is obvi-
ous that rj > rˆ cannot be profitable, since such a deviation would have no eﬀect on the
competition for consumer (li, xi), i 6= j but decreases the expected profit from consumer
(lj , xj) for U1-Dj. So suppose rj < rˆ. This can have three possible eﬀects: it reduces
the expected profit of U1-D1 when the consumer is located on line l1, since D1 will face
stronger competition from Dj for such consumers; it reduces the joint profit of U1 and Dk
but does not benefit Dj when the consumer is located on line lk, k 6= j 6= 1, since D1 will
match Dj ’s lower price for such a consumer;32 and it may increase the profit for Dj when
the consumer is located on line lj and hence Dj may be willing to make a higher transfer
payment to U1. Since contracts are private and beliefs are symmetric, potentially the most
desirable deviation that U1 can make is to oﬀer every Dj the reduction in r, so that every
Dj may be willing to pay a higher t to U1. But then the industry profit will again be given
by Π(r) under the new r, as defined by equation (5’).33 Since rˆ has already been chosen
to maximize Π(r), the new r must lead to a lower Π(r), which means that U1-D1 must





. Therefore, the proposed is indeed an equilibrium
Fourth, we can argue that there can be no other equilibrium under symmetry beliefs. If
there were another equilibrium where r 6= rˆ, U1 could oﬀer a deviating contract with r = rˆ
to every Dj, j 6= 1, resulting in an industry profit Π(rˆ) > Π(r) under symmetry beliefs.34
This would allow U1 to oﬀer a transfer payment to each Dj so that the deviating oﬀer is
accepted. We can thus extend Proposition 1 to the spokes model with n ≥ 2 downstream
32Importantly, D1 is in direct competition with Dj and has both the incentive and ability to constrain Dj
whenever Dj attempts to sell to the consumer on lk. This makes it irrelevant that Dk does not observe the
contract oﬀer to Dj.
33The same would be true if beliefs were passive, since D1 knows the lower r for each Dj and each Dj
knows that D1 knows that. This mechanism of information exchange undere the vertical integration of
U1-D1, in combination with the facts that D1 is in direct competition with every other D firm and that D1
internalizes the opportunity cost to U1 of a lost sale at price r, allows U1-D1 to achieve the outcome as if
contracts were public even under passive beliefs.
34This argument would not apply if beliefs were passive, and thus under passive beliefs there may be other
equilibrium if c = 0.
34
competitors.
Proposition 1’ The game where U1 is the only upstream supplier has a unique equilib-




, which is accepted by Dj, j = 2, ..., n. Di is the
potential seller with price P ∗((li, xi), rˆ, rˆ) if the consumer is located at (li, xi), i = 1, ..., n.





− 12τ , and rˆ decreases in n.
Thus, just as in the downstream duopoly model, the firm that is nearest to the consumer
will bid the lowest price and will make the sale if this price does not exceed the consumer’s
valuation. The equilibrium rˆ is above c for the same reason as in the duopoly case: it
reduces downstream competition and thus raises industry profits.
Returning to upstream duopoly, when Dj contracts to purchase from U2 at (0, c) , D1
will charge c + τ (1− xi) < min{Pm1 (1− xi) , rˆ + τ(1 − xi)} if the consumer is located at






τ(1− 2x) [1− F (c+ τ(1− x))] dx,
which is lower than the joint U1-Dj profit under rˆ.35














[P2 (x, rˆ)− τx− rˆ] [1− F (P2 (x, rˆ))] dx,













τ(1− 2x) [1− F (c+ τ(1− x))] dx, (7’)
where t∗ < 0.
35Again, we note that, due to the vertical integration of U1 and D1, D1 knows if Dj deviates to contracting
with U2; and that downstream competition is non-localized so that D1 can eﬀectively compete with Dj for
consumers on any lk, k 6= j 6= 1.
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To complete our argument for extending Proposition 2, we also need to show that, at
the possible equilibrium where Dj contracts with U1 at r = rˆ for j 6= 1, it would not be
profitable for U2 to oﬀer r < c to any subset of D1 ≡ {Dj: j 6= 1}. Such a deviation can be
potentially profitable only if the downstream firms receving the deviating oﬀer expect to sell
more than they actually would (and are thus willing to pay more than what would actually
cost U2 ). But this is not possible under symmetry beliefs: for any subset of D1 receiving
the deviating oﬀer, they will jointly sell more than what they expect, since they will sell to
the consumer at all locations including l1. Thus the deviation cannot be profitable for U2.
We can thus extend Proposition 2 as follows:
Proposition 2’ The game where the upstream market is a duopoly has an equilibrium in
which U2 oﬀers Dj (0, c) and U1 oﬀers Dj exclusive contract (t∗, rˆ) , and Dj contracts with
U1, j = 2, ..., n.This downstream outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly.
The intuition here is the same as in the downstream duopoly case: When the integrated
firm supplies D2, ..., Dn at a price above marginal cost, the former has less incentive to
undercut the latter because of the opportunity cost of foregone input sales to Dj. This
dampening of horizontal competition explains U1 ’s advantage and ability to preempt U2.
The r that is optimal under upstream monopoly is again chosen to maximize the joint
industry profits, and t∗ is chosen so that each stand-alone firm is willing to enter the exclusive
contract with U1. If any Dj, j = 2, ..., n deviates and contracts with U2 at (0, c) , D1will
reduce its price to c + τ (1− xi) for any consumer located at (li, xi) , i 6= 1, making the
expected joint profit between U2-Dj lower than the expected joint profit between U1-Dj
under rˆ, which implies that no deviation would occur.36
Since rˆ > c, just as in the downstream duopoly case, the use of exclusive contracts is
crucial for U1 to be able to exclude U2 and to raise the downstream prices.
We now turn to the last issue: what happens if U1 and D1 are vertically separated?
Under downstream duopoly and vertical separation, exclusive contracts are irrelevant due
to competitive (marginal cost) contracting for the intermediate good. This result holds when
36Notice that since in equilibrium U2 oﬀers (0, c) , adding additional upstream firms that are the same as
U2 will not change the results.
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there are multiple downstream competitors as well.
First, we can argue that there in equilibrium ri ≤ c for any i. Suppose to the contrary that
r1 > c, and r1 ≥ rj, j 6= 1. If r1 > rk > r˜ ≡ min{rj : j 6= 1}, the upstream firm contracting
with D1, say U1, can profitably oﬀer D1 a deviating contract with r01 = rk that increases
the joint profit of U1-D1. If r1 > r˜ = min{rj : j 6= 1} = rj , U1 can profitably oﬀer D1 a
deviating contract with r01 = r˜ that increases the joint profit of U1-D1. If r1 = r˜ = min{rj :
j 6= 1} = rj > c, the upstream firm that is not contracting with all downstream firms (either
U1 or U2 ) can oﬀer a deviating contract with r˜ − ε , to a properly chosen subset of the
downstream firms, and this deviation is profitable when ε (> 0)→ 0.
Second, we can argue that it is an equilibrium for both U1 and U2 to oﬀer (0, c) to all
downstream firms and U1 ’s oﬀer is accepted by all Di, i = 1, ..., n.
(i) Consider first deviations with r > c. Extending our earlier notations, with Uj sup-
plying Di, let Πi (r1, ...rn) be the joint profit of Di-Uj that results from Di ’s possible sale,
when Dj ’s unit price for the input is rj and Dj and Dk have correct beliefs about rj and
rk for all j, k. Then, suppose that a downstream firm, say D1, receives a deviating oﬀer
r > c from, say, U2 . Under symmetry beliefs, D1 needs to receive at least Π1 (c, r, ...r) to be
willing to accept the deviating oﬀer, while the joint profit between U2-D1, if U2 has made
the deviating oﬀer only to D1, is no more than Π1 (r, r, ...r) < Π1 (c, r, ...r) . Thus such a
deviation cannot be profitable. If U2 makes the deviating oﬀer to several or all Dj, again
each Dj would need to receive at least Π1 (c, r, ...r) to be willing to accepte the deviating
oﬀer, while the joint profit of U2 with each Dj is at most Π1 (r, r, ...r) . Again any such
deviation would not be profitable.
(ii) Consider next deviations with r < c. Such a deviation from either upstream firm,
say, U2, can be potentially profitable only if the downstream firms receving the deviating
oﬀer expect to sell more than they actually would (and are thus willing to pay more than
what would actually cost U2 ). But this is not possible under symmetry beliefs: if only
some downstream firms receive the deviating oﬀer, they will jointly sell more than what
they expect; and if all downstream firms receive the deviating oﬀer, they will jointly sell
the same as what they expect.
37
We can thus extend Proposition 3 to the case with multiple downstream competitors:





(0, c) for all j = 1, ..., n. Furthermore, there can be no equilibrium with rj > c for any
j = 1, ..., n.
APPENDIX B: THE CIRCLE MODEL
We now consider an alternative way of extending our model to multiple downstream
firms. Instead of considering non-localized competition in the downstream market, we
consider localized competition, adopting the circular city model of Salop (1979). Assume
that the consumer is located with equal chance at any point of a circle with a perimeter
equal to 1. Firms are located equidistant from each other on the circle. With n > 2
firms, D1, D2, ...,Dn, the distance between any two neighboring firms is simply 1n . Let
D1 be located at the bottom of the circle, followed clockwise by D2, ..., Dn. Thus, D1 ’s
neighboring firms on the left and on the right are denoted as D2 and Dn, respectively. The
realized location of the consumer is denoted as x ∈ [0, 1],where x = 0 if the consumer is at
the bottom of the circle (the position of D1 ), and x increases clockwise (so, for instance,
x = 12 if the consumer is located at the top point of the circle). In what follows we shall only
sketch our analysis, under the same contracting and belief assumptions as in Appendix A.
Unlike our spokes model where each firm competes directly against the market, in the
circle model each firm competes directly only against its two neighbors. If U1 and D1 are
vertically separated, then again the only equilibrium outcome is for all downstream firms
to purchase the input at price c, same as in our basic model with rather similar reasoning.
In what follows we thus assume that U1 and D1 are vertically integrated. For convenience,
we shall focus on the case n = 4, and will in the end discuss the cases n > 4 and n = 3.
With n = 4, D1 competes with D2 and D4 respectively when x ∈ [0, 14 ] and x ∈ [34 , 1],
D2 competes with D3 when x ∈ [14 , 12 ], and D3 competes with D4 when x ∈ [12 , 34 ]. Notice
that the only firm D1 does not compete with directly is D3. Denote the contract U1 oﬀers
to Dj by (tj , rj) , j = 2, 3, 4.
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As before, we first characterize the equilibrium rj if U1 were the only upstream producer.
(1) We must have r∗3 = c in equilibrium.
If r∗3 > c, U1 can deviate by privately oﬀering r03 = r∗3−ε to D3, where ε > 0 is suﬃciently
small. This deviation has no eﬀect on the competition between D1 and D2 or between D1
and D4, when the consumer is located on the lower half of the circle, but it increases the
joint profit of U1 and D3 when the consumer is located on the upper half of the circle. It
would thus be profitable for U1 to make the deviating oﬀer and for D3 to accept the oﬀer,
under proper transfer payment. Therefore in equilibrium we must have r∗3 = c.
(2) In equilibrium, U1 is able to raise the input price of its neighbors; i.e., r∗2 > c and
r∗4 > c, and to raise the final price for the consumer.
We shall look for r2 and r4 such that the joint profits of U1-D1-D2 are maximized when
the consumer is located on the left half of the circle and the joint profits of U1-D1-D4 are
maximized when the consumer is located on the right half of the circle. (Note that we
already know r∗3 = c.) Because of symmetry, the equilibrium r∗2 and r∗4 would be equal.
For consumer x located between D1 and D2 (x ∈ [0, 14 ]), the consumer’s distances from
D1 and D2 are x and 14−x, respectively. Since the distance of consumer x from D3 is 12−x,














or37 r2 ≤ c + 14τ . But since c + 14τ < c + τ ≤ Pm1 (0) , it follows that, for any x ∈ [0, 14 ],
in equilibrium D1 and D2 will charge prices that are below their unconstrained monopoly
prices. The equilibrium prices for consumer x are thus equal to max{r2+τ(14 −x), r2+τx},













where D2 serves if x ∈ [14 , xˆ2]with price c+ (12 − x)τ and D3 serves if x ∈ [xˆ2, 12 ].
37 If this condition is not satisfied, then D3 would compete with D1 for consumer x ∈ [0, 1
4
]. By lowering
r2 to c + 14 τ , the price for x is not changed but the profits to D3 would go to D2. Thus, to look for the
optimal r2,we need to restrict to r2 ≤ c+ 14τ .
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Therefore, the expected joint profit of U1-D1-D2 when the consumer is located on the
left half of the circle is






























































































we must have Π0 (r2)|r2=c > 0, and thus rˆ2 > c. Therefore, corresponding to Proposition 1,
we have:
The game where U1 is the only upstream supplier has a (refined) unique equilibrium.
At this equilibrium, r∗2 = r∗4 = rˆ2 > c, and r∗3 = c.D1 is the potential supplier when
x ∈ [0, 18 ]^ [78 , 1], D2 is the potential supplier when x ∈ [18 , xˆ2], D3 is the potential supplier





2 , and D4 is the potential supplier when x ∈ [xˆ3, 78 ].
We now return to the case of upstream duopoly. If D2 were to contract with U2, the
contract that would maximize the joint profit of U2-D2 and give all this profit to D2 is
(0, c).The joint profit of U1-D1-D2 when the consumer is located on the left half of the
circle would then be Π (c) < Π (rˆ2) . Notice that D20sprofit when it accepts (0, c) from U2
is 23Π (c) , and U1-D1 ’s profit from this part of the circle is
1
3Π (c) .
Now let t∗2 be such that D20sprofit when it accepts (t∗2, rˆ2) from U1 is
2
3Π (c) . Then,
D20sprofit when it accepts (t∗2, rˆ2) from U1 is the same as that when it accepts (0, c) from
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U2, and U1 will indeed oﬀer (t∗2, rˆ2) to D2 since Π (rˆ2) − 23Π (c) > 13Π (c) . Therefore,
corresponding to Proposition 2, we have:
The game where the upstream market is a duopoly has a unique equilibrium outcome,
where U1 contracts with D2 and D4 at (t∗2, rˆ2) ,while D3 contracts with either U1 or U2 at
(0, c) . The downstream equilibrium outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly.
More generally, if n > 4, in equilibrium we must have r∗2 = r∗n > c and r∗j = c for
j = 3, ..., n − 1; and the downstream equilibrium outcome under upstream duopoly is the
same as under upstream monopoly.
The n = 3 case is diﬀerent because D2 and D3 compete directly both with U1 and with
each other. Consequently the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 depends on r3. By the theorem of
the maximum there exists a continuous bounded function σ (r3) such that r2 = σ (r3) ≥ c
maximizes the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 given any r3 ≥ c, and by Brouwer’s theorem there
exists a fixed point r∗ = r2 (r∗) that defines a symmetric equilibrium r∗3 = r∗2 = r∗. Finally,
the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 is increasing in r2 when r2 = c, which implies r∗ > c.
Therefore, in the circle model with multiple downstream firms, just as in our basic model
and spokes model, vertical integration in combination with exclusive contracts excludes an
equally (or more) eﬃcient supplier and partially cartelizes the downstream industry. Neither
of these practices alone achieves these eﬀects. However, the extent of upstream foreclosure
and downstream cartelization depends importantly on the nature of competition–whether
it is localized or non-localized, in addition to on the level of concentration in the downstream
market. With localized competition (the circle model), the integrated firm can only cartelize
the two neighboring downstream firms and exclude an upstream competitor in supplying
these two firms.
APPENDIX C: PROOFS
Proofs for Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Proposition 1, and Proposition 3 follow.
Proof of Lemma 2: First consider the cases where x ≤ 12 . Notice that τx ≤ τ(1 − x).
From standard arguments in Bertrand competition, P1(x, r1) maximizes the joint profits of
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U1 -D1 given D2 ’s oﬀer, D2 ’s oﬀer is optimal for D2 given P1(x, r1), and the consumer will
select the firm with the lower cost, which is D1 here. The consumer will make the actual
purchase if P1(x, r1) ≤ v.
Next consider the cases where x > 12 . Notice that τx > τ(1 − x) in these cases. Notice
also that, since Pm1 (x) − c − τx decreases in x from Lemma 1, we may possibly have







≥ r1+ 12τ . We proceed with two possible situations:
(i) Suppose Pm1 (x) > r1+τx. At P2(x, r1) = min {Pm2 (x, r1), r1 + τx} , with the customer
selecting D2, the expected profit of U1 -D1 is [r1 − c] [1− F (P2(x, r1))] .
If D1 undercuts D2 so that it would be selected by the customer, the expected profit of
U1 -D1 is less than
[r1 + τx− (c+ τx)] [1− F (r1 + τx)] ≤ [r1 − c] [1− F (P2(x, r1))] .
On the other hand, given D1 ’s oﬀer, it is optimal for D2 to charge P2(x, r1) and to be
selected by the customer. Thus the proposed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.






Pm1 (x) . With the same logic as above, competition between D1 and D2 must drive the
price down to Pm1 (x) , and the consumer selects D2.








2τ .We shall show that the expected industry profit is higher under







2τ . Since t1 and t
0
1
will be chosen such that the expected profits of D2 are zero under the respective contracts,
it follows that the expected profit for U1 -D1 must be higher under contract (t01, r01) than
under contract (t1, r1) , which produces a contradiction.
First consider the cases where x ≤ 12 . Since τx ≤ τ (1− x) and





≤ r01 + τ (1− x) < r1 + τ (1− x) ,
the equilibrium price will be P1(x, r1) = Pm1 (x), under either r1 or r
0
1, and the customer will
select D1. Therefore for x ≤ 12 , both contracts produce the same expected industry profits.
Now consider the cases where x > 12 . Then P
m











from Lemma 1. Thus








< Pm1 (x) < r
0
1 + τx.
Let xˆ > 12 be such that either xˆ uniquely solves
Pm1 (xˆ) = r1 + τ (1− xˆ) ,
or xˆ = 1 if Pm1 (1) < r1. Then for
1
2 < x < xˆ, P
m
1 (x) < r1 + τ(1− x).
Hence, under r1, the equilibrium price will be Pm1 (x) but D1 will be selected by the
customer for 12 < x < xˆ; while under r
0
1 the equilibrium price will also be P
m
1 (x) but D2
will always be selected by the customer for 12 < x ≤ 1. Therefore, for 12 < x ≤ 1, industry
profits will be higher under r01 than under r1, since τ (1− x) < τx.
Thus expected industry profits are higher under r01 than under r1, contradicting that
(t1, r1) is an equilibrium contract.






everything else follows directly from Lemmas 1-3 and from Assumption A2.
We first show that Pm1 (0) − τ < rˆ. Suppose to the contrary Pm1 (0) − τ ≥ rˆ. Then,
Pm1 (0) > rˆ + τx and P
m
1 (0) > rˆ + τ(1− x), for all x ∈ (0, 1). We thus have





P2 (x, rˆ) = min {Pm2 (x, rˆ), rˆ + τx}} < Pm1 (0) < Pm1 (1− x) for
1
2
< x < 1.
By raising rˆ slightly above Pm1 (0) − τ , both P1(x, rˆ) and P2(x, rˆ) will be closer to Pm1 (x)
and Pm1 (1 − x), respectively, for all 0 < x < 1, which would lead to a higher expected
industry profit than under rˆ ≤ Pm1 (0) − τ . This implies that it cannot be optimal for U1
to oﬀer rˆ ≤ Pm1 (0)− τ ; and therefore rˆ > Pm1 (0)− τ .










− 12τ , since











the equilibrium prices would be P1(x, rˆ) = Pm1 (x) for x ≤ 12 and
P2 (x, rˆ) = min {Pm2 (x, rˆ),min{Pm1 (x) , rˆ + τx}} > Pm1 (1− x) for
1
2
< x ≤ 1.
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That is, P1(x, rˆ) is optimal for x ≤ 12 while P2 (x, rˆ) is ineﬃciently too high for x > 12 .A
slight reduction in rˆwould reduce both P1(x, rˆ) and P2 (x, rˆ) for x that is close to 12 , causing a
first-order increase in industry profits for those x that are to the right of 12 and a second-order







Proof of Proposition 3.
We begin with some preliminaries. Let
P (x, r1, r2) = min {Pm (x, r1) , r2 + τ (1− x)}
with Pm = Pm (x, r1) defined implicitly by




Pm is the monopoly price for D1 to serve a consumer at marginal cost (r1 + τx). If
[r2 + τ (1− x)] is the marginal cost ofD2, then equilibrium prices aremax {P (x, r1, r2) , r1 + τx}
for D1, and max {P (1− x, r2, r1) , r2 + τ (1− x)} for D2. Bertrand competition implies
that the downstream firm with the lowest marginal cost wins the customer. Thus, if
(r1 + τx) ≤ [r2 + τ (1− x)], the equilibrium outcome is for D1 to serve consumer x at
price P (x, r1, r2).















x˜ is the marginal consumer served by D1, when D1 has marginal cost (r1 + τx) and D2
has marginal cost [r2 + τ (1− x)] .
The joint profits of an upstream-downstream pair are defined as follows. Let
π (x, r1, r2) = [P (x, r1, r2)− c− τx] [1− F (P (x, r1, r2))] .




π (x, r1, r2)dx.
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We proceed by proving two claims.
Claim 1. There can be no equilibrium where ri > c for any i.
Suppose to the contrary that there is some equilibrium where ri > c for at least one i.
Without loss of generality, suppose that r1 > c, and r1 ≥ r2. We maintain that firms hold
symmetry beliefs. There are two possible cases.
Case 1: r1 and r2 are oﬀered by the two diﬀerent upstream firms, say r1 by U1 and r2 by
U2. If r1 > r2, U1 can oﬀer a deviating contract r01 = max{r2, c} to D1, which would result
in a joint profit for U1-D1 that is higher than their joint profit at the proposed equilibrium.
If r1 = r2 = r > c, then x˜ (r1, r2) = 12 and U1-D1 ’s joint profit is Π(r, r). Consider a
deviation contract from U1 to D1 with r01 = r − ε > c and ε > 0. Under symmetry beliefs,
D1 will set P (x, r − ε, r − ε) for the consumer with x < 12 and r− ε+ τx for the consumer
with x ≥ 12 . Since D2 will continue to set r + τ (1− x) for x < 12 and P (1− x, r, r) for
x > 12 , the profit of U1-D1 under the deviation is




[P (x, r − ε, r − ε)− c− τx] [1− F (P (x, r − ε, r − ε))] dx+Z x˜
1
2
(r − ε+ τx− (c+ τx)) [1− F (r − ε+ τx)] dx
where x˜ > 12 satisfies P
m (1− x˜, r) = r + τ x˜, and x˜ is independent of ε. The inequality
above is due to the fact that D1 can sell to consumers even with x > x˜. When ε→ 0,Z 1
2
0
[P (x, r − ε, r − ε)− c− τx] [1− F (P (x, r − ε, r − ε))] dx → Π(r, r),Z x˜
1
2
(rˆ − ε− c) [1− F (rˆ − ε+ τx)] dx → δ
where δ is some strictly positive constant. Therefore Π(r−ε, r) > Π(r, r) when ε→ 0. Thus
U1 will make a profitable deviation oﬀer to D1 that will be accepted.
Case 2: r1 and r2 are oﬀered by the same upstream firm, say U1. Denote the joint profit
of U1-D1-D2 (or U2-D1-D2) by Π˜ (r1, r2) . If r1 > r2, U2 can oﬀer both D1 and D2 a
deviating contract with some optimally chosen r ∈ [r2, r1] so that Π˜ (r, r) > Π˜ (r1, r2) .
Such an r must exist, since with r1 > r2 at the proposed equilibrium downstream costs
are not minimized. Under symmetriy beliefs, the joint profit for U2-D1-D2 will precisely
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be Π˜ (r, r) . Thus U2 will profitably provide enough transfers to both D1 and D2 so that
the oﬀer will be accepted. If r1 = r2 = r > c, one of the downstream firms, say D1, must
receive at most 12Π˜ (r, r) . U2 can oﬀer D1 a deviating contract with r1 = r − ε, and when
ε→ 0 the joint profit of U2-D1 will be higher than 12Π˜ (r, r) . The deviation oﬀer will thus
be profitably made and accepted.
Claim 2. There exists an equilibrium in which ( tij, rij) = (0, c) for i, j = 1, 2, D1 accepts
the contract oﬀered by U1, and D2 accepts the contract oﬀered by U2.
Step 1. There can be no profitable deviations with ri > c. Suppose U2 (or U1 ) deviates by
oﬀering r > c to firm D1 (or to D2 or to both of them). D1 believes that the same oﬀer has
been made to D2 as well, and D2 will set P (1− x, r, r) if x > 12 and r+τ (1− x) otherwise.
D1 then needs to receive at least payoﬀ Π (c, r) to be willing to accept the deviation oﬀer,
since it can acceptU1 ’s (0,c) contract and expects to receive at leastΠ (c, r) under symmetry
beliefs.38 Similarly, D2 needs to receive at least profit Π (c, r) to be willing to accept the
deviation oﬀer. If U2 makes the deviating oﬀer to D1 only, the joint profit between U2-D1
is no more than Π (r, r) , which is less than Π (c, r) . If U2 makes the deviating oﬀer to both
D1 and D2, the joint profit between U2-D1-D2 is no more than Π (r, r)+Π (r, r) , which is
less than Π (c, r) +Π (c, r) . In either case, the deviating oﬀer cannot be both acceptable to
the downstream firm(s) and be profitable to U2.
Step 2. There can be no profitable deviations with ri < c. Suppose that U2 deviates
by oﬀering r < c to firm D1 (and potentially r2 ≥ r to D2 ). By accepting the oﬀer, D1
expects to receiveZ 1
2
0




[r + τ (1− x)− r − τx] [1− F (r + τ (1− x))] dx.
Without accepting the oﬀer, D1 expects to receiveZ x˜
0
[P (x, c, r)− c− τx] [1− F (P (x, c, r))] dx =
Z x˜
0
[r + τ (1− x)− c− τx] [1− F (r + τ (1− x))] dx
38Since D2 ’s price under the belief that r1 = r > c is higher than its price under the belief that r1 = c,
D1 expects a profit that is at least Π (c, r) .
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[r + τ (1− x)− c− τx] [1− F (r + τ (1− x))] dx.









[1− F (P (1− x, c, c))] dx+ t.
If U2 oﬀers r to D1 and r2 ≥ r to D2, since all possible sales will be made by D1 and U2







[1− F (P (x, r, r))] dx+ t
#














[1− F (P (x, r, r))] dx+ t > 0.

























[r + τ (1− x)− c− τx] [1− F (r + τ (1− x))] dx < 0
since r + τ (1− x) < c+ τx for x ∈ [x˜, 12 ].
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